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Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line 
Steven A. Ramirez* 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 10, 1940 the German Army opened a massive 
offensive aimed at France.1  Five weeks later, on June 14, 1940, 
the Germans occupied Paris and essentially knocked the French 
out of World War II.2  The French defense strategy relied upon a 
system of fixed fortifications on the French frontier known as the 
Maginot Line, which ran from Switzerland to Luxembourg.3  The 
Germans countered the Maginot Line with a new form of 
mechanized warfare that allowed them to fly over and drive 
around the fixed fortifications with airplanes and armored 
vehicles, through the unfortified Ardennes Forest.4  The engine-
driven warfare of World War II displaced the trench warfare of 
World War I and rendered the Maginot Line strategically 
irrelevant.  Indeed, the Maginot Line drew massive resources 
from the French military elsewhere, engendered an illusory 
sense of security, and enabled the Germans to craft a strategy in 
full view of the primary French defense deployments.5  While the 
Maginot Line would have helped the French effort to win a war 
like World War I (a catastrophe for all concerned), it did little to 
prevent France’s more catastrophic defeat in World War II, and 
even hastened the French defeat.6 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank)7 may prove as 
ineffective as the Maginot Line.  It will likely foreclose a 
 
* Professor and Director, Business and Corporate Governance Law Center; Loyola 
University Chicago; Sramir3@luc.edu. 
 1 Gary Sheffield, The Fall of France, BBC (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.; JULIAN JACKSON, THE FALL OF FRANCE: THE NAZI INVASION OF 1940, at 26 
(2003). 
 4 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 39. 
 5 Id. at 26–27. 
 6 J. E. KAUFMANN & H. W. KAUFMANN, FORTRESS FRANCE: THE MAGINOT LINE AND 
FRENCH DEFENSES IN WORLD WAR II 166 (2006); WILLIAM ALLCORN, THE MAGINOT LINE 
1928–45, at 57 (2003). 
 7 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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subprime mortgage crisis like the one that nearly crashed global 
capitalism in the fall of 2008; however, it will not foreclose a 
future debt crisis that could well eclipse the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 in terms of severity and macroeconomic pain.8  The 
Dodd-Frank Act does nothing to address the underlying structure 
of globalization that creates incentives for excessive debt and 
impairs employment in the United States and throughout the 
developed world.  This renders future debt crises inevitable.  
Banks have every incentive to enhance their profits (especially 
short-term profits that may support higher CEO compensation) 
while being exposed to excessive risks of the financial crisis.9  
Most importantly, the largest American banks continue to benefit 
from government subsidies under the too-big-to-fail legal 
construct that permits banks to privatize gains and socialize 
losses.10  Banks can continue to manipulate risks and profits 
through the use of derivatives and securities trading for many 
years to come.11  Thus, while Dodd-Frank may prevent another 
subprime crisis, it will prove unable to prevent a future, more 
serious debt crisis.12  Indeed, it may render such a crisis more 
likely by transforming implicit guarantees for megabanks into 
explicit guarantees.13 
 
 8 According to Noble laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz in an interview by Kerry 
O’Brien on ABC Australia: 
It can and it almost surely will happen again, because we didn’t 
deal with the problem of too-big-to-fail banks.  It is one of the 
reasons why it will happen again.  And we didn’t really deal 
effectively with all the kinds of excessive risk-taking, all the 
problems of lack of transparency that were at the core of this crisis.  
And so, yes, we understand what the issues are, we understand the 
issues better than we did three years ago, but politics intruded the 
power of the banks, was too great.  They’re making $20 billion off of 
derivatives.  So rather than lending, they’re engaged in all of these 
kinds of gambling and excessive risk-taking and generating large 
profits, but it’s not helping the American economy and it’s putting 
at risk American taxpayers. 
The 7.30 Report: Troubles Ahead for World Economy, ABC (Austl.) (July 27, 2010), 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s2965891.htm. 
 9 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A31. 
 10 Simon Johnson, Banking’s ‘Toxic Cocktail’ Is Too Big to Forget: Simon Johnson, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 26, 2011, 9:03 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-
01-26/banking-s-toxic-cocktail-is-too-big-to-forget-simon-johnson.html (opining that “the 
situation still is dire”). 
 11 Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2010, at A1. 
 12 NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE 
FUTURE OF FINANCE 239 (2010) (raising the prospect of sovereign debt defaults among the 
“risky rich” and concluding that such a crisis “may well take place in a disruptive, 
disorderly fashion” and, if so, “won’t be pretty”). 
 13 John B. Taylor, The Dodd-Frank Financial Fiasco, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at 
A19 (“Effectively the bill institutionalizes the harmful bailout process by giving the 
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Part I of this article will explore the broad outlines (details 
will remain elusive) of such a future crisis in order to reveal the 
challenges facing legal reform.  Part II will compare the risks 
highlighted in Part I with the key elements of Dodd-Frank as 
well as the gaps left unaddressed in Dodd-Frank.  The article 
concludes that the Dodd-Frank Act will not help avert the next 
crisis and may well facilitate or exacerbate the next crisis.  Much 
like the Maginot Line, Dodd-Frank encourages complacency, 
represents a massive diversion of resources and encourages bank 
managers to strategically flank its proscriptions.  Dodd-Frank, 
unfortunately, limits itself to the last crisis, not to the next crisis. 
I.  THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE DEBT 
Debt continues to plague the global economy.  In the United 
States, for example, while the rate of debt accumulation slowed 
during the crisis, it now seems poised to reaccelerate to levels 
that are even higher than those at the outset of the crisis.14  The 
United States’ current account deficit is increasing again, 
meaning that the nation continues to borrow hundreds of billions 
of dollars per annum from abroad.15  The U.S. economy remains 
the consumer of last resort for the global economy, thereby 
fueling growth throughout the developing world.  Since dollars 
earned from selling to the United States exceed those spent on 
buying from the same, the excess is plowed into U.S. debt 
instruments.16  This constant demand for the purchase of U.S. 
debt instruments induces excessive debt in the United States by 
lowering interest rates on dollar denominated debt.17  This debt 
funds higher consumption in the United States and the only 
question remaining today is when the next debt bubble will bust. 
The former chief economist of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Professor Simon Johnson, sees future debt problems 
arising from the recent extension of the Bush-era tax cuts.  
Specifically, Johnson argues that the recent bi-partisan 
agreement to extend the so-called Bush tax cuts “moved us closer 
 
government more discretionary power to intervene . . . .  The problem of ‘too big to fail’ 
remains, and any cozy relationship between certain large financial institutions and the 
government that existed before the crisis will continue.”). 
 14 U.S. Current Account Gap Widens, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 17, 2010, at A2. 
 15 Peter Morici, Morici: Japan Sound, U.S. Insolvent, FOXBUSINESS.COM (Jan. 27, 
2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/01/27/peter-morici-japan-sound-
insolvent/. 
 16 Don Lee, Mountain of Economic Trouble Ahead?, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 2010, at 3, 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-06-20/business/ct-biz-0620-global-
economy-20100620_1_consumer-debt-global-economy-american-consumer. 
 17 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Thanks to the Deficit, the Buck Stops Here, WASH. POST, Aug. 
30, 2009, at B3. 
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to a fiscal crisis, just as the euro zone now is experiencing.”18  The 
extension of those tax cuts will add $400 billion to the U.S. 
government’s fiscal deficit in 2011, creating the second largest 
deficit since World War II.19  The IMF found that the tax cuts 
would have little stimulative effect given their cost.20  On 
January 28, 2011, Moody’s threatened to downgrade the credit 
rating of the United States as early as 2013.21  Usually, an 
economic crisis leads to chronic fiscal deficits for governments 
because an economic contraction means diminished tax 
revenues.22  In the United States, the decision to cut taxes, even 
for the wealthiest, means deeper deficits with minimal 
countervailing economic benefit.23 
The United States also faces problematic state and local 
debts.  Like the federal government, state and local tax 
collections plunged during the financial crash and still hover 
below the pre-crisis level.24  Expenditures increased in the face of 
more economic suffering and needs arising from increased 
unemployment and poverty.25  Meredith Whitney, a bank analyst 
renowned for her prescient prediction of the financial collapse, 
projects a major crisis in the state and municipal bond markets.26  
Whitney recently claimed that up to one hundred municipal bond 
issuers may default, leading to hundreds of billions in losses.27  
She terms this problem “the single most important issue in the 
US, and certainly the largest threat to the US economy.”28  Credit 
rating agencies now warn that downgrades and increasing yields 
 
 18 Simon Johnson, Tax Cutters Set Up Tomorrow’s Fiscal Crisis: Simon Johnson, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 22, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-
23/tax-cutters-set-up-tomorrow-s-fiscal-crisis-commentary-by-simon-johnson.html. 
 19 Damian Paletta et al., Deficit Outlook Darkens: Stark Warning for 2011 Fuels 
Battle Over Government Spending and Taxation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A1. 
 20 Michael R. Crittenden, IMF Urges U.S. to Take Fiscal Steps to  
Cut Deficit, WSJ.COM (Jan. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704268104576108123476047128.html. 
 21 Jed Graham, U.S. Debt Shock May Hit in 2018, Maybe As Soon As 2013, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 6, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.investors.com/ 
NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=532490. 
 22 Sharing the Pain: Dealing with Fiscal Deficit, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2010, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/15604130. 
 23 Paul Krugman, Let’s Not Make a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at A25. 
 24 Ezra Klein, How Much Can We Blame on State Pensions?, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 
2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/10/brooks_draft.html. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Nicole Bullock, Spotlight Falls on US Cities’ Fundraising, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2011, at 4. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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in the state and local bond markets will exacerbate funding 
challenges state and local governments are facing.29 
Similarly, student loans will inexorably create more bank 
losses because of the dearth of job opportunities for graduates.  
Recently, student loan debt burgeoned past one trillion dollars 
and now exceeds credit card debt.30  Unemployment among 
recent graduates soared in the wake of the financial crisis as 
salaries fell, with no significant recovery in sight.31  Many 
student loans carry punitive, even predatory features.32  With 
student debt at a record high, a wave of defaults appears 
inevitable and already reached an eleven-year high in 2008.33  
The exposure of the financial sector to student loan losses is 
unclear at best.34  While many of these loans are guaranteed by 
the federal government, these losses do not disappear.35  Rather, 
they exacerbate the risk of a sovereign debt crisis afflicting the 
federal government, as discussed above. 
Many private student loans are held by the financial system 
which may well absorb further massive losses to bank capital.  
For example, according to economist Nouriel Roubini, who 
famously predicted the financial collapse in the fall of 2008, “one 
of the most important risks” facing the global economy is the 
“likely” spread of the Eurozone debt crisis to Portugal, Spain, and 
Belgium.36  Moreover, the IMF and the stronger nations of 
Europe seemingly lack the resources to contain this crisis.37  In 
affected nations, the economic crisis holds profound political 
implications and appears likely to topple governments.38  
 
 29 Jeanette Neumann, Global Finance: Warning From S&P on Munis, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 24, 2011, at C3. 
 30 Scott Cohn, Student Loans Leave Crushing Debt Burden, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 21, 
2010, 7:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40772705/ns/business-cnbc_tv/. 
 31 Steven Greenhouse, ‘Glimmers of Hope’ for Grads, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at 
B1. 
 32 Mary Pilon, The $555,000 Student-Loan Burden, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703389004575033063806327030.html. 
 33 Hibah Yousuf, Student Loan Default Rate Creeps Higher, CNNMONEY.COM  
(Sept. 13, 2010, 11:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/13/pf/college/ 
student_loan_default_rate/index.htm. 
 34 Eric Dash, Citigroup to Sell Unit that Lends to Students, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2010, at B3. 
 35 Student Loan Debt Slaves, LIBERTY INSIGHT (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://libertyinsight.com/2011/01/13/student-loan-debt-slaves/. 
 36 Michael Heath, Roubini Sees Spread of Europe Debt Crisis Among Key 2011 Risks, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-17/roubini-sees-
spread-of-europe-debt-crisis-among-key-2011-risks.html. 
 37 Nouriel Roubini, Global Risk and Reward in 2011, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 13, 
2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roubini34/English. 
 38 Gavin Hewitt, The Eurozone Crisis and the Voters, BBC NEWS BLOG  
(Jan. 25, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2011/01/ 
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Currently, the Eurozone holds out hope that restructuring debts 
can resolve the crisis.39  Such restructuring, however, is likely to 
trigger loss realization among Eurozone banks and lead to 
another source of stress on bank capital.  European banks have a 
total exposure of twice their capital to sovereign debt of so-called 
peripheral European Union nations.40  Thus, restructuring may 
well simply replace one debt crisis with another. 
These sovereign credit issues may trigger massive losses 
throughout the global financial system.  Because the government 
allowed the previous system of financial non-regulation and mis-
regulation to fester unabated until the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act on July 21, 2010, bank exposure to these sources of 
financial losses are largely governed by the pre-Dodd-Frank 
regime.41  Most importantly, it is impossible to surmise which 
banks have what exposure to losses arising from these sources of 
financial losses.  Banks are largely able to gamble with this risk 
through the derivatives markets on a completely unregulated 
basis.42  When losses from these sources are realized, bank 
capital could be compromised.  This is particularly so, given that 
banks still face massive losses of unknown magnitude from 
before the period of 2007–2009.43 
For example, bank capital remains under siege from the 
massive foreclosure crisis arising from the “utter carelessness” of 
the banks during the real estate boom.44  Essentially, banks not 
only engaged in reckless underwriting of high-risk residential 
real estate loans, they also failed to document mortgages and 
repayment rights appropriately (destabilizing middle class 
 
the_eurozone_crisis_and_the_vo.html. 
 39 Europe Bends Over to Help Greece Rip Up Debts, ASSOCIATED FOREIGN PRESS 
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jXmo2b42waHr-
ZKyfjOIPOiyQT_w?docId=CNG.6b94de75d88998f6d0176a48ce43503c.191. 
 40 John Paul Rathbone, Eurozone Can Learn Grim Latin Lessons, FIN. TIMES  
(Dec. 21, 2010, 11:20 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac9b6954-0d33-11e0-82ff-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1CgfvDT9H. 
 41 The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. 
See Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04173:@@@R (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).  Therefore, the banking 
industry was governed by pre-Dodd-Frank regime prior to July 21, 2010. 
 42 David Min & Pat Garafalo, Regulating Derivatives Traffic: Establishing Speed 
Limits and Traffic Lights to Improve Derivatives Safety, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 19, 
2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/derivatives_traffic.html. 
 43 Martin Jacques, The New Depression, NEW STATESMAN (Feb. 12, 2009), available 
at http://www.newstatesman.com/economy/2009/02/financial-crisis-china-banks. 
 44 U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011) (Cordy, J., 
concurring) (“[W]hat is surprising about these cases is not the statement of principles 
articulated by the court regarding title law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts, 
but rather the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to 
their assets.”). 
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property rights along the way).45  The entire industry used 
fictitious mortgagees on recorded mortgage documents to evade 
state and local recording fees.46  Banks seem to have lost (or at 
least failed to negotiate to purchasers) huge numbers of 
negotiable instruments such that many mortgage debts suffer 
impaired enforcement.47  According to bank analyst Chris 
Whalen, the banks will suffer debilitating losses as a result of 
this recklessness for years to come akin to a kind of “cancer” on 
their financial health.48  This cancer will impair bank earnings 
and balance sheets for years to come.  This will compound losses 
flowing into the financial sector from the continued meltdown of 
residential real estate into 2011.49  Banks still hold exposure to 
trillions of dollars in residential real estate loans, most of which 
now suffer from impaired valuation.50 
As the residential real estate market continues to melt down, 
banks face numerous other challenges.  The commercial real 
estate market may inflict billions more in losses on the financial 
sector.  Despite bank efforts to “extend and pretend” that 
commercial loans are not troubled, a record high amount of 
commercial loans are in default.51  Nearly one trillion dollars of 
consumer debt suffers from serious delinquency.52  Low interest 
rates impair net interest income as margins shrink.53  Thus, 
 
 45 Barry Ritholz, Foreclosure Fraud Reveals Structural & Legal Crisis, ROUBINI 
GLOBAL ECONOMICS (Oct. 10, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.roubini.com/us-
monitor/259737/foreclosure_fraud_reveals_structural___legal_crisis. 
 46 See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, 
and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359 (2010) 
(analyzing MERS, a nominee mortgage holder which was created by banking industry to 
evade recording fees, and how it conflicts with laws and policy). 
 47 Gretchen Morgenson & Andrew Martin, Battle Lines Forming in Clash Over 
Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A1. 
 48 Interview by Bloomberg with Christopher Whalen, Managing Director, Inst. Risk 
Analytics (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/video/63795070/. 
 49 Alejandro Lazo, Home Prices Decline in November, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 25, 
2011, 6:28 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/01/home-prices-declined-
in-november.html. 
 50 Steven A. Ramirez, Are the Megabanks Insolvent?, CORPORATE JUSTICE BLOG, 
(Nov. 23, 2010, 3:36 PM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/are-
megabanks-insolvent.html. 
 51 Julie Satow, ‘Bad Boy’ Guarantees Snarl Billions in Real Estate Debt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2011, at B9. 
 52 Christine Ricciardi, More Current Mortgages Go Delinquent in 3Q as Household 
Debt Falls, HOUSINGWIRE, Nov. 8, 2010, available at http://www.housingwire.com/ 
2010/11/08/more-current-mortgages-go-delinquent-in-3q-as-household-debt-falls. 
 53 See Joe Rauch, Corrected: Wells and US Bancorp Profits Up but Margins 
Squeezed, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/us-
lvabanks-earnings-idUSTRE70I5SJ20110119?pageNumber=2. 
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experts evince serious concern that many banks, particularly the 
most risky megabanks, flirt with insolvency.54 
Further, economic growth appears unlikely to rescue the 
banks.  Consumer deleveraging will continue to suppress demand 
for quite some time.55  While the government seemingly mustered 
endless resources to save a handful of banks, government 
programs to help the great mass of American citizens can only be 
termed modest at best.56  Unemployment rivals the joblessness 
during the Great Depression, with little relief expected.57  
Government spending seems destined to contract as austerity 
rhetoric takes hold.58  Finally, the banks themselves continue to 
hoard capital in the form of excess reserves which now total one 
trillion dollars.59  Economic pessimism and concerns regarding 
financial markets caused non-financial firms to hoard nearly two 
trillion dollars more.60  All of this suggests continued economic 
sluggishness, more losses on outstanding debt, and therefore 
more bank losses. 
The United States faces a crisis.  Its banking and financial 
sector fails to lend, and lending plays a crucial role in growth.61  
 
 54 William K. Black & L. Randall Wray, Foreclose on the Foreclosure Fraudsters, 
Part I: Put Bank of America in Receivership, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2010, 2:08 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/foreclose-on-the-foreclos_b_772434.html; 
Simon Johnson, Time for Some New Stress Tests for Banks, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG 
(Oct. 21, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/time-for-some-
new-stress-tests-for-banks/.  See also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT 
REPORT: EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT61835/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT61835.pdf 
(assessing foreclosure crisis and concluding that “[b]ank regulators should also conduct 
new stress tests on Wall Street banks to measure their ability to deal with a potential 
crisis”). 
 55 James Saft, Good-bye Credit Crunch, Hello Slog, REUTERS BLOG (Jan. 25, 2011, 
9:04 AM), http://blogs.reuters.com/jim-saft/2011/01/25/good-bye-credit-crunch-hello-slog/. 
 56 Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the 
Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 727, 787–88 (2010). 
 57 Ann Saphir, Cleveland Fed: US Jobless Rate Likely to Stay High, REUTERS  
(Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/31/usa-fed-unemployment-
idINN3123119920110131. 
 58 See Martin Crutsinger, Builders Began Work on Fewer Projects in 2010, 
KANSASCITY.COM (Feb. 1, 2011, 9:18 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/2011/02/01/ 
2624194/builders-began-work-on-fewer-projects.html (“Spending on government projects 
fell in December 2.8 percent.  State and local spending dropped 1.8 percent and spending 
by the federal government plunged 11.6 percent to the lowest level since October 2004.”). 
 59 Silvio Contessi, Are Bank Reserves and Bank Lending Connected?, MONETARY 
TRENDS (Feb. 2011), http://research.stlouisfed.com/publications/mt/20110201/cover.pdf. 
 60 Justin Lahart, Companies Cling to Cash: Coffers Swell to 51-Year High as 
Cautious Firms Put Off Investing in Growth, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2010, at A1, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703766704576009501161973480.html. 
 61 This contraction of credit predictably arose from a financial sector facing capital 
depletion even after a bailout as incumbent bank managers (who logically should have 
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Its economy fails to generate jobs.62  Yet the economy faces a debt 
burden on par with the level of debt on the eve of the subprime 
crisis.63  The financial sector faces staggering losses from a 
variety of sources.  The entire global economy bears too much 
debt.64  Another debt crisis appears inevitable.  When this crisis 
hits, creditors will flee for safety and credit costs for the entire 
economy will soar as they did in 2008.  At that point, markets 
will need to reckon with the fiscal position of the U.S. 
government.  The key issue will be whether the U.S. government 
will rescue the megabanks again.  Dodd-Frank suggests that the 
government will do precisely that, as shown below.65  Then, the 
riskiness of the megabanks will once again privatize gains and 
socialize losses, which would culminate into a crisis that could 
make the subprime crisis seem like an appetizer to a far more 
grand main course. 
II.  THE FAILURES OF DODD-FRANK 
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a toxic mix of affirmatively 
dangerous statutory law, while at the same time failing to 
address key structural causes of the financial crisis.  The 
continued presence of toxic debt, for example, is a direct function 
of a flawed model of globalization that Dodd-Frank (indeed, our 
entire political leadership) left unaddressed.  Under Dodd-Frank, 
the perverse incentives created by too-big-to-fail and the primary 
arenas for such incentives will continue to operate unimpeded for 
at least years to come.  Finally, Dodd-Frank leaves the same 
inept bank managers in power at the apex of our economy and 
 
been terminated in the wake of their reckless stewardship) sought to conceal the full 
extent of losses and become very risk-averse in order to maintain their incumbency. 
Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 DAYTON L. REV. 81, 96–
101 (2009). 
 62 Jon Hilsenrath, Messy New Estimates Complicate Explanation for Unemployment 
Rate Drop, WSJ.COM BLOG (Feb. 4, 2011, 1:12 PM), available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/02/04/messy-new-estimates-complicate-explanation-
for-unemployment-rate-drop/. 
 63 Annaly Capital Management, Charts of the Day: The New Z.1 is Out!, CREDIT 
WRITEDOWNS (Sept. 21, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2010/09/charts-
of-the-day-the-new-z-1-is-out.html. 
 64 Daniel Fisher, The Global Debt Bomb, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/debt-recession-worldwide-finances-global-debt-
bomb.html. 
 65 Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recently admitted that in the event of 
another credit crisis “we may have to do exceptional things again.” OFFICE OF THE 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TEMPORARY ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (Jan. 26, 2011) (“To the extent that those ‘exceptional things’ 
include taxpayer-supported bailouts, his acknowledgement serves as an important 
reminder that TARP’s price tag goes far beyond dollars and cents, and that the ultimate 
cost of TARP will remain unknown until the next financial crisis occurs.”). 
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financial system despite proof positive of their willingness to 
inflict massive and reckless risks upon our system in exchange 
for short-term gains and concomitant compensation payments.66 
A. Fundamentally Flawed Globalization 
The global economy relies upon the U.S. dollar as its reserve 
currency, and this central flaw means excessive accumulation of 
debt in the United States and the developed world generally.67  
As issuer of the reserve currency, the United States must act as 
borrower of last resort and consumer of last resort for the global 
economy.68  The problem is that it cannot sustainably fulfill this 
role any longer and the dollar reserve system is now breaking 
down in a sea of debt that will trigger serial crises.69  Over two 
years after the greatest debt crisis in our history, the global 
economy is still rigged to create excessive debt within the United 
States.70  Further, the dollar reserve system weakens demand 
within the global economy which contributes to the loss of jobs in 
the United States.71  Dodd-Frank fails to address this dynamic in 
any way whatsoever and therefore can only be termed a failure of 
political will.72  This failure of political will, in turn, represents 
the powerful interests that continue to benefit from this flawed 
 
 66 Raghuram Rajan, Banker’s Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2008), 
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto010920081142101282 (noting the 
incentives for CEOs and financial managers to tolerate excessive risks that increase 
short-term returns in order to receive immediate compensation). 
 67 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 245–68 (2006) [hereinafter 
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK]. 
 68 Id. at 265. 
 69 Id. at 254–56. 
 70 Aaron Task, Cruel Irony: Dollar’s Reserve Status Enables U.S. Debt Addiction, 
YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker/cruel-irony-
dollar%27s-reserve-status-enables-u.s.-debt-addiction-535886.html.  See also Joseph 
Stiglitz, Towards a New Global Reserve System, in ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE 
FUTURE GLOBAL RESERVE SYSTEM—AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 1, 2 (Jeffrey D. Sachs et al. 
eds., 2010), available at http://aric.adb.org/grs/papers/Future_Global_Reserve_System.pdf 
(showing that “the dollar reserve system contributed to global financial instability and a 
weak global economy” because “the reserve currency country got increasingly in debt as 
others held more of its IOUs as part of their reserves” and “the build-up of reserves by 
surplus countries led to weaknesses in global aggregate demand”). 
 71 See Stiglitz, Towards a New Global Reserve System, supra note 70, at 2. 
 72 According to Fed Chair Ben Bernanke: 
One way or the other, fiscal adjustments sufficient to stabilize the federal 
budget must occur at some point.  The question is whether these adjustments 
will take place through a careful and deliberative process that weighs priorities 
and gives people adequate time to adjust to changes in government programs 
or tax policies, or whether the needed fiscal adjustments will be a rapid and 
painful response to a looming or actual fiscal crisis. 
Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech before the National Press Club: The 
Economic Outlook and Macroeconomic Policy (Feb. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110203a.htm. 
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model of globalization—CEOs of transnational corporations, 
particularly in the United States.73 
Dodd-Frank fails to address the problems arising from this 
deeply flawed model of globalization.  Indeed, although the Act 
mandates at least sixty-seven studies from various agencies, it 
does not require any study of the impact of globalization or the 
dollar reserve system.74  This is despite the fact that many 
prominent economists and other commentators proposed sensible 
solutions to the problem both before and after the crisis.  For 
example, Joseph Stiglitz recently highlighted a “remarkably 
simple solution” (first proposed by John Maynard Keynes) to the 
problem of reserves: allow the IMF to issue Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) to act as a reserve currency so that no single 
nation would bear the burden of the concomitant debt.75  I 
recently expanded upon this proposal and argued that this new 
issuer of a new reserve currency could act as a bank, and 
leverage these currency reserves through fractional banking to 
fund low-cost loans for high pay-off development initiatives that 
could vindicate economic human rights.76  This would divert 
reserves from funding excessive debt in the United States to 
funding sustainable global growth. 
B. Too-Big-to-Fail Endures 
If credit markets perceive that a bank will not be allowed to 
fail due to government intervention or guarantees, then creditors 
will supply more credit at a lower cost.  Further, managers will 
tolerate excessive risk because they anticipate that gains are 
privatized while losses are socialized through government 
backing.77  Since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, there is 
 
 73 Steven A. Ramirez, American Corporate Governance and Globalization, 18 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 47, 63 (2007). 
 74 The SEC, CFTC, FDIC and Federal Reserve System each maintain websites 
detailing the reports and studies they issue. See Reports and Studies, U.S. COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ 
ReportsandStudies/index.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); Implementing Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Accomplishments, U.S. SEC. EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2011); FDIC and Financial Regulatory Reform, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); Regulatory Reform, 
FED. RESERVE., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform.htm (last visited Mar. 
16, 2011); Christine Harper, Crash of 2015 Won’t Wait for Regulators to Rein in Wall 
Street, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-
09/crash-of-2015-won-t-wait-for-regulators-to-buckle-wall-street-safety-belts.html. 
 75 STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 67, at 260. 
 76 Steven A. Ramirez, Taking Economic Rights Seriously after the Debt Crisis, 42 
LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
 77 Ramirez, supra note 61, at 82. 
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increasing skepticism that the Act will prevent future bailouts of 
large financial firms in a manner different from the ad hoc 
bailouts of late 2008.78  The statutory details of the Dodd-Frank 
Act belie any claim that it ended bailouts for firms deemed too-
big-to-fail.79 
Section 1101 paves the way for the Fed to bail out large 
banks, so long as it does so pursuant to a program or facility that 
features “broad-based eligibility.”80  Indeed, the Act directs the 
Fed and the Treasury to create emergency lending programs and 
facilities “[a]s soon as practicable.”81  Similarly, section 1105 of 
the Act directs the FDIC, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Treasury, to create a “widely available program to guarantee 
obligations of solvent insured depository institutions or solvent 
depository institution holding companies (including any affiliates 
thereof) during times of severe economic distress. . . .”82  As a 
result, after Dodd-Frank, virtually every type of bailout pursued 
by the Fed and the FDIC that occurred between 2007 and 2009 
will now be more explicitly and more broadly available.83  
Ironically, Dodd-Frank therefore mandates more “broad-based” 
and “widely available” bailouts.84 
Dodd-Frank also includes an “Orderly Liquidation 
Authority” (OLA) for large, systemically significant firms that 
appear poised to “default.”85  Such firms may be placed into FDIC 
receivership, but only upon a vote of at least: (1) 2/3 of the 
members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, (2) 2/3 of 
the members of the board of directors of the FDIC, and (3) a 
written recommendation of the Treasury Secretary (made in 
consultation with the President).86  As receiver, the FDIC holds 
 
 78 The Ruling Ad-Hocracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, at A12. 
 79 Text of Obama Remarks on Dodd-Frank, MARKETWATCH (Jul 21, 2010, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/text-of-obama-remarks-on-dodd-frank-2010-07-21. 
 80Title XI Overview: 11.1 Emergency Lending Authority to Be Used Only to Provide 
Broad-based Liquidity, AM. BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.aba.com/RegReform/RR11_1.htm 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
 81 Dodd-Frank Act § 1101.  Section 1101 amends section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act, which operated as the primary mechanism of bailouts through the use of funds 
supplied by the Federal Reserve System. Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual 
Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis, 11 EUR. BUS.  
ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584731. 
 82 Dodd-Frank Act § 1105. 
 83 See Johnson, supra note 81 (“Under the Dodd-Frank Act amendment, it would 
appear that the Federal Reserve would have been unable to lend directly to Bear Stearns 
or AIG unless Bear Stearns or AIG would have otherwise qualified for the terms of a 
facility or program in place ‘with broad-based eligibility.’”). 
 84 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1101, 1105. 
 85 Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b). 
 86 Id.  Recently President Obama named William Daley, Midwest Chairman of JP 
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total managerial power and succeeds by operation of law to all 
powers of the stockholders, officers, and directors.87  The FDIC 
thus controls all aspects of a firm’s business, including decisions 
whether to liquidate or sell the company or parts of the 
company.88  The FDIC may make loans to guarantee assets or 
obligations or to purchase assets of any financial company put 
into FDIC receivership under this authority.89  This further 
expands bailout powers.90  The Act includes provisions designed 
to conceal this form of bailout; however, in the end creditors do 
not face a real prospect of loss in a crisis due to government 
funding.91  If senior executives or directors of a firm are 
“substantially responsible” for the failure of the firm, whether by 
gross negligence or disregard of a duty of care, any compensation 
they received within two years of receivership may be recouped 
by the FDIC.92  This OLA process consequently could dissuade 
mangers from excessive risk.  Nevertheless, most firms will never 
enter that process due to the multiple approvals necessary to 
trigger the process and the political influence of the financial 
sector.93 
Dodd-Frank also gives regulators the power to break up 
systemically risky firms.  Ultimately, keeping banks from 
 
Morgan Chase & Co., as his new Chief of Staff. Becky Yerak, William Daley Becomes 
White House’s Business Connection, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-31/business/ct-biz-0131-daley-chase-20110131-
137_1_william-daley-jpmorgan-chase-business-connection (“‘It’s a big plus for the banking 
industry,’ . . . banking analyst Richard Bove said of Daley’s move to the White House 
earlier this month.  ‘The fact that a banker is chief of staff is going to change the rhetoric 
dramatically.  With Daley there, JPMorgan will benefit, along with every other bank.’”). 
 87 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(A). 
 88 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1).  Should the government ever muster the political will, 
this provision paves the way to fragment the megabanks the next time they flirt with 
insolvency.  Unfortunately, the FDIC too often exercises its managerial powers to create 
even larger banks. See David Mildenberg, Citigroup Agrees to Buy Wachovia’s Banking 
Business, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWwkv.J3bhY4. 
 89 Dodd-Frank Act § 204(d).  Under section 206, these actions must be for the 
purpose of financial stability, not for the benefit of any particular company, and must be 
approved by the Treasury under section 210(n)(9). 
 90 See Taylor, supra note 13 (“The FDIC does not have the capability to take over 
large, complex financial institutions without causing disruption, so such firms and their 
creditors are likely to be bailed out again.”). 
 91 Robert J. Shiller, Bailouts, Reframed as ‘Orderly Resolutions’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2010, at BU5. 
 92 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 210(f), 203(c)(2)(s). 
 93 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 6 (2010).  According to Senate Majority Whip Dick 
Durbin, the banking industry is the “most powerful lobby” and they “frankly own the 
place.”  Representative Collin C. Peterson, the former Chair of the House Agriculture 
Committee, claims that they “run the place.” Ramirez, supra note 61, at 81. 
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growing too large limits their economic and political influence.94  
As a result, commentators greeted this part of the Act with some 
degree of optimism.95  However, section 121 requires a 
determination by the Fed that a firm poses a “grave threat” to 
financial stability as well as the approval of 2/3 of the newly 
created Financial Stability Oversight Board.96  No divestiture can 
proceed without the Fed finding that other mitigatory actions are 
“inadequate” for addressing threats to financial stability.97  Thus, 
divestiture must be a last resort after all other options are 
exhausted, and this presumably is subject to judicial review.  
Notably, all of the too-big-to-fail banks that the government 
rescued in 2008 are even larger today.98  Further, they remain 
dangerously leveraged.99  As such, they all have proven to pose a 
grave threat to financial stability, with little or no countervailing 
economic benefit.100  Yet no action to mitigate that threat is 
 
 94 In fact, the FDIC routinely manages large banks in the context of traditional 
failed bank receiverships without severe economic or financial consequences.  The largest 
such receivership to date is WaMu Savings Bank with $307 billion in assets, which 
occurred at the height of the financial crisis with minimal impact. Robin Sidel et al., 
WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, 
WALL ST. J., Sep. 26, 2008, at A1. 
 95 Simon Johnson, A Roosevelt Moment for America’s Megabanks?, PROJECT 
SYNDICATE (July 14, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/johnson10/ 
English. 
 96 See Dodd-Frank Act § 121. 
 97 See id. 
 98 Thomas M. Hoenig, Op-Ed., Too Big to Succeed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A37 
(“[T]he five largest financial institutions are 20 percent larger than they were before the 
crisis.  They control $8.6 trillion in financial assets—the equivalent of nearly 60 percent of 
gross domestic product.  Like it or not, these firms remain too big to fail.”). 
 99 Anat R. Admati, Should Mega Banks Be Broken Apart?: Bankruptcy Is Not an 
Option, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/ 
2010/12/07/should-megabanks-be-broken-apart/bankruptcy-is-not-an-option.  Numerous 
studies demonstrate that banks should be required to hold much more capital than they 
are currently required by law to hold or what they will be required to hold under the 
Basel III international capital accords. See generally David Miles et al., Optimal Bank 
Capital, Discussion Paper No. 31, BANK OF ENGLAND,  (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/externalmpcpapers/extmpcpaper0031.pdf; 
Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital 
Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive 4 (Stan. Grad. Sch. of Bus., Research 
Paper No. 2065, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669704. (“Setting equity requirements significantly higher than 
the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social 
costs.”).  Thus, not only does the United States continue to suffer from too-big-to-fail 
banks, but these banks are also significantly undercapitalized. 
 100 Simon Johnson, Should Megabanks Be Broken Apart?: We Haven’t Learned From 
Ireland, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/12/07/ 
should-megabanks-be-broken-apart/we-havent-learned-from-ireland (“There are no 
economies of scale or scope in banking over about $100 billion in assets.  [There is not] a 
single piece of evidence that society gains from having megabanks at today’s scale and 
with today’s leverage.”). 
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pending, much less any break-up.  Break-ups consequently 
appear remote. 
Creditors have already concluded that Dodd-Frank preserves 
the too-big-to-fail subsidies and therefore will fuel the continued 
growth of such banks with cheaper capital.  In fact, due to the 
presence of government backing, the credit ratings agencies 
specifically give the megabanks much higher credit ratings than 
otherwise, notwithstanding Dodd-Frank.101  Thus, according to 
Neil Barofsky, the Special Inspector General of the TARP 
program: “These [too-big-to-fail] institutions and their leaders 
are incentivized to engage in precisely the sort of behavior that 
could trigger the next financial crisis, perpetuating a doomsday 
cycle of booms, busts and bailouts.”102  As economist Simon 
Johnson puts it: “If the big banks get large enough, we’ll become 
like Ireland today—saving those institutions will ruin us fiscally, 
destroy the dollar as a haven currency, and end financial life as 
we know it.”103 
Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. also concludes that “Dodd-
Frank does not solve the [too-big-to-fail] problem.” 104  He concurs 
that too many avenues remain open for regulators to rescue 
creditors of large banks, and that those regulators now have a 
proven track record of indulging powerful banking interests, such 
as managers of too-big-to-fail megabanks.105  Finally, Professor 
Wilmarth echoes economists such as Joseph Stiglitz: “There is an 
obvious solution to the too-big-to-fail banks: break them up.  If 
they are too big to fail, they are too big to exist.”106  Thus, 
Congress ignored the thinking of leading academics and 
economists and instead preserved the economic and political 
power of the most reckless bankers in U.S. history, despite their 
 
 101 Ronald D. Orol, ‘Too Big to Fail’ a Recipe for Disaster, Watchdog Says, MARKET 
WATCH (Jan. 25, 2011, 6:47 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/too-big-to-fail-a-
recipe-for-disaster-watchdog-2011-01-26?reflink=MW_news_stmp. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Simon Johnson, ‘Citi Weekend’ Shows Too-Big-to-Fail Endures: Simon Johnson, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 17, 2011, 9:10 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-
01-17/-citi-weekend-shows-too-big-to-fail-endures-simon-johnson.html. 
 104 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response 
to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 3 (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719126. 
 105 Id. 
 106 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF 
THE WORLD ECONOMY 165–66 (2010).  See also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, supra 
note 93, at 221 (“The best defense against a massive financial crisis is a popular 
consensus that too big to fail is too big to exist.”);; ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 12, at 226 
(“[N]ot only are such firms too-big-to-fail;; they’re too big to exist, and too complex to 
manage properly.”). 
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central role in causing the crisis.107  To the extent politicians sold 
Dodd-Frank as the end of taxpayer-funded bailouts for large 
financial firms, it may well prove a monumental political 
fraud.108 
C. The Derivatives and Hedge Fund Casino is Open Too Late 
Derivatives are complex financial contracts that derive their 
value by reference to some other securities, commodities or debt 
instruments.109  Hedge funds are private pools of capital that 
may invest or speculate in the full range of financial products.110  
Hedge funds and derivatives exposed banks to massive losses 
that were not transparent to regulators, often because of the fact 
that much of this activity occurred through unregulated 
affiliates.111  A review of Dodd-Frank regarding derivatives and 
securities prohibitions illustrates that banks may continue to 
gamble with derivatives and other complex securities and hedge 
fund “investment” for years to come.112 
Under section 716, banks are generally prohibited from 
using derivatives.113  But, there is an exception for “bona fide 
hedging and traditional bank activities.”114  This exception 
apparently would include eighty percent of the derivatives 
market.115  The prohibition on derivatives in this section does not 
even take effect until July 21, 2012.116  Further, the prohibition 
regarding bank derivative activities may be extended until 
July 21, 2014, or possibly as late as July 21, 2015.117  Finally, 
banks may continue to trade derivatives through affiliates in 
accordance with Federal Reserve strictures.118  Thus, all of the 
derivative trading that fueled the crisis will continue for at least 
 
 107 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 
1032–43 (2009). 
 108 Watchdog Disputes White House Claim that Wall Street Reform Will End Taxpayer 
Bailouts, ABCNEWS (Jan. 27, 2011, 10:02 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2011/01/ 
watchdog-disputes-white-house-claim-that-wall-street-reform-will-end-taxpayer-
bailouts.html. 
 109 Dodd-Frank Act § 716. 
 110 Id. 
 111 CCH, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, 
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 30–31 (2010). 
 112 Id. at 28. 
 113 Dodd-Frank Act § 716. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Orrick, Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, FINANCIAL 
MARKETS ALERT, July 21, 2010, at 3–4, available at http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/ 
2833.pdf. 
 116 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(h). 
 117 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(f). 
 118 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(c). 
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four years, and most derivatives trading will be permissible for 
banks thereafter.  Moreover, during that hiatus, banks can be 
counted on to use their considerable political influence to further 
dilute the derivatives prohibitions.119 
Section 723 mandates that derivatives transactions be 
cleared, but regulators have one year for promulgating a process 
by which determinations are made for which derivatives must be 
cleared and which ones may remain over-the-counter.120  
Specifically, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
and the Securities Exchange Commission must “review each 
swap, or any group, category, type, or class of swaps to make a 
determination as to whether the swap or group, category, type or 
class of swaps should be required to be cleared.”121  The following 
factors, among others, bear upon this determination: (1) liquidity 
for given type of derivative, (2) pricing data, and (3) effect on 
systemic risk.  If no facility wishes to clear a type of derivative 
then no clearing is necessary.122  Thus, highly customized 
derivatives likely need not be cleared.  Again, the exceptions 
threaten to swallow the rule, and much depends upon regulatory 
rule-making.123  Further, the clearinghouses themselves may now 
be too-big-to-fail because if they were to fail the banks would be 
exposed to huge losses.124  To the extent that the large banks that 
control a huge portion of derivatives trading are the most 
influential members of the new derivatives exchanges, the entire 
effort to shift counterparty risk of default to the clearinghouses 
could lead to even bigger bailouts.125  Rather than controlling risk 
through clearing of derivatives, Dodd-Frank may give the large 
banks even more power. 
The Act’s approach to securities trading and bank hedge 
fund activities similarly proves relatively toothless.  Under 
section 619, banks cannot engage in proprietary trading or invest 
in hedge funds.126  The Fed, however, may permit bank 
 
 119 John Carney, Blanche Lincoln Is Gone.  Will Dodd-Frank Derivatives Rules Be 
Next?, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2010, 11:44 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40007299/ 
Blanche_Lincoln_Is_Gone_Will_Dodd_Frank_Derivatives_Rules_be_Next. 
 120 Dodd-Frank Act § 723. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Aline Van Duyn, Derivatives Still in Flux as Dodd-Frank Deadline Looms, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6211d098-2b07-11e0-a65f-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1HJV8vyP3. 
 124 Gretchen Morgenson, Count on Sequels to TARP, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at 
BU1. 
 125 Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2010, at A1. 
 126 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(a). 
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investments in illiquid hedge funds or private equity funds until 
2022.127  Liquid funds may be held until 2017.128  Indeed, nothing 
changes at all until October of 2012, and no divestitures are 
required until October of 2014, at the earliest.129  While some 
transition time may be warranted, a spin-off to shareholders or 
public investors could certainly occur within a year.130  In any 
event, bank capital will continue to be exposed to securities 
trading and hedge funds for many years notwithstanding the so-
called Volcker Rule.131 
The second problem is the exceptions to the trading and 
hedge fund ban under section 619.132  Hedging, underwriting and 
market-making activities are permissible.133  Banks may still 
continue to organize and offer hedge funds and private equity 
funds.  They may still devote up to three percent of their capital 
to trading and hedge fund investments.134  The regulators may 
further permit trading and investments that promote “the safety 
and soundness of the banking entity . . . and the financial 
stability of the United States.”135  These exceptions may well 
operate to swallow the rule when it takes effect in coming years 
and decades.  Even the intellectual father of these rules—former 
Fed Chair Paul Volcker—remains dissatisfied with the so-called 
Volcker Rule.136 
This approach toward securities and derivatives trading 
exacerbates the fundamental distortion toward risk.  The 
exceptions to the prohibition of derivatives trading within banks 
swallow the rule.  The Act allows banks to trade securities and 
invest in hedge funds into the next decade.  Thus, the Act gives 
large banks a subsidized cost of capital while largely preserving 
their ability to gamble in the derivatives and securities markets.  
CEOs and other senior bank managers therefore face the 
identical incentives to gorge on risk that they faced before 2008 
to ring up short profits without regard to future losses that may 
 
 127 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(c)(3)(B).  See also Financial Regulation, SKADDEN (Jan. 10, 
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come to fruition only after the payment of incentive-based 
compensation.  Even if a firm approaches insolvency, the 
payment of golden parachute arrangements further blunts the 
disincentives senior managers face for excessively risky conduct. 
D. CEOs as the New Potentates 
Public corporations in the United States are burdened by 
excessive CEO autonomy.137  As John Cassidy highlights, 
economists and others have reached a “rare consensus” that 
managerial pay played a central role in the financial crisis.138  
The essential problem revolves around the manipulation of risk 
to achieve artificially high profits today, at the expense of long-
term solvency.139  Ultimately, Dodd-Frank fails to disrupt this 
reality in the foreseeable future, despite including some positive 
steps. 
For example, section 951 gives shareholders a say on pay via 
non-binding shareholder resolutions to approve executive 
compensation including severance pay.140  Section 952 requires 
all listed companies to have independent compensation 
committees with the power to directly retain compensation 
advisers, including independent legal counsel.141  Section 953 
directs the SEC to issue rules requiring more expansive 
disclosures to shareholders regarding executive compensation, 
“including information that shows the relationship between 
executive compensation actually paid and the financial 
performance of the issuer, taking into account any change in the 
value of the shares of stock and dividends of the issuer and any 
distributions.”142  Section 954 mandates the SEC to promulgate 
rules requiring national securities exchanges and associations to 
prohibit the listing of issuers that do not comply with their own 
compensation recovery policies.143  In these policies, issuers must 
set forth requirements on recovery of executive compensation in 
 
 137 Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO 
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 139 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A37, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/opinion/23krugman.html. 
 140 Dodd-Frank Act § 951. 
 141 Dodd-Frank Act § 952. 
 142 Dodd-Frank Act § 953. 
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the event there was a material noncompliance that led to an 
accounting restatement.144  Further, under these policies, the 
issuers must be able to recover up to three years worth of 
executive compensation from the date of an accounting 
restatement.145  Due to the perception that financial CEOs 
manipulated risk to enhance their compensation, Congress 
directed the Fed to issue rules creating independent risk 
management committees at large bank holding companies.146  
Each of these laudatory initiatives mitigates the control of the 
CEO and senior management over the public firm, yet even 
taken together, they will not alter the autonomy of CEOs over 
the proxy machinery and the board of directors. 
Other sections do, in fact, address this core source of CEO 
power.  Section 957 now requires rules of exchanges to prohibit 
broker votes without shareholder direction in all “significant 
matter[s],” including executive compensation and election of 
members of the board of directors.147  This is a significant step 
toward real corporate democracy.  Uninstructed broker votes 
distort election results, thereby benefiting managers because 
they “almost always are cast in favor of management’s proposals 
and candidates for board seats,” according to the Council of 
Institutional Investors.148  This new rule ensures that biases in 
favor of management are removed in contested elections or proxy 
contests. 
Section 971 could operate to create more contested elections, 
as it explicitly gives the SEC the power to permit shareholders to 
use companies’ proxy solicitation materials to nominate 
directors.149  The struggle for shareholder access to 
management’s proxy for the purpose of director elections lingered 
for decades prior to Dodd-Frank.150  The SEC’s exercise of this 
power could hardly warrant the term radical; the SEC rule 
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allows shareholders with three percent ownership or more that 
have held such ownership for at least three years to nominate 
directors to stand for election through management’s proxy 
statement.151  Nevertheless, the SEC unexpectedly stayed the 
effectiveness of its own rule in response to lobbying efforts from 
business interests.152  Therefore, at least until 2012, this rule 
remains mired in litigation.153  In the meantime, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the current managers hold too much sway over board 
members, who in turn are subject to insufficient accountability 
under law.154 
In all, these changes hold the potential for a real revolution 
in corporate governance.  Yet, that revolutionary change will 
take years to take root.  The power of the CEO in the public firm 
has receded in the past ten years with respect to key elements of 
the public firm such as the audit committee and the nominating 
committee.155  The Dodd-Frank Act constitutes another step in 
the federal redesign of corporate governance to stem excessive 
CEO autonomy.  Nevertheless, it will take years for these 
changes to take root in the boardroom.  Even after the litigation 
challenging shareholder proxy access ends, it will take many 
years for boards to truly exercise independence from the CEO in 
the face of long-standing institutional barriers to independent 
monitoring.156  Simply put, deeper and more fundamental reform 
of corporate governance is needed to take effect more rapidly.  
The Act offers a package of reforms on this front that will likely 
prove to be too little too late in order to fundamentally change 
managerial incentives for at least the next decade. 
E. Winning the Subprime War 
Dodd-Frank effectively stems predatory lending and holds 
the potential to reduce the prospect of exploitative debt 
generally. 
Under section 1403: “[N]o person shall pay to a mortgage 
originator . . . compensation that varies based on the terms of the 
loan (other than the amount of the principal).”157  Section 1404 
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creates broad private remedies for the violation of this 
prohibition.158  This should end the steering of prime borrowers 
into subprime loans.159  Section 1411 requires mortgage lenders 
to make a good faith determination that a mortgage loan can be 
repaid.160  Section 1413 permits the victim of a loan that does not 
comply to raise a violation of section 1411 as a defense even 
against subsequent assignees, and even after the expiration of 
any statute of limitations.161  The amount of the defense includes 
costs and attorney fees.  This should end predatory loans.162  
Section 917 requires a study regarding financial literacy.163  
Section 1021 requires the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau to conduct financial education programs and to 
promulgate regulations prohibiting abusive and predatory 
loans.164 
In aggregate, these provisions reflect Congressional 
determination to stem abusive and predatory lending which lay 
at the root of the subprime debacle.  Consumer lending will not 
likely form the center of a future credit crisis as a result of these 
provisions.  Indeed, critics suggest the Dodd-Frank Act 
essentially abolishes all but “plain vanilla” mortgages.165 
CONCLUSION 
Like the Maginot Line, the Dodd-Frank Act will prove useful 
in winning the last war—the subprime crisis—but it will not 
prevent future debt crises.  The Dodd-Frank Act can only be 
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termed an epic failure of policy.  The Act includes some positive 
elements such as the corporate governance reforms and 
predatory finance prohibitions.  Nevertheless, the importance of 
these reforms pales in comparison to the risks of another 
financial meltdown, as well as deeply impaired macroeconomic 
performance far into the future. 
The Act allows massive government guarantees of the 
largest financial concerns to persist and even makes such 
backstops explicitly available under law.166  This continues the 
massive subsidies implicit in the too-big-to-fail problem, and 
entails a proven means of assuring excessive risk in the financial 
system.  Indeed, the Act formalizes the power of the FDIC and 
the Fed to bail out systemically critical financial institutions.167  
The orderly liquidation process offers further bailout 
mechanisms.  Dodd-Frank therefore continues regulatory 
indulgence, even facilitation, of excessive risk in the financial 
sector.  
The Act also allows essentially unbridled derivatives and 
securities trading for years into the future and beyond.168  Large 
banks will in fact likely control any derivatives clearinghouse or 
exchange which are likely themselves too-big-to-fail.169  Many 
derivatives will not be cleared and banks will continue to trade 
these instruments.  Hedge fund investments also continue after 
the Act.170  So, the very risky securities and trading activities 
that culminated in the crisis of 2007–2009 may continue 
unabated despite the presence of the massive subsidized capital 
provided by the government. 
The Act mitigates these negative elements through the 
possibility of corporate governance reform.  Yet, there is no 
restoration of private liability and the government continues to 
act parsimoniously to say the least in pursuing criminal actions 
and civil enforcement through the SEC.  The remaining 
provisions may well diminish CEO autonomy to saddle the firm 
with excessive risk as a means of pumping up current profits, but 
these provisions will not compensate for the basic profit 
incentives in favor of recklessness and fraud within the 
boardroom of the public firm.  The best hope for changing this 
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outcome, shareholder nominees to the board, could take years to 
hold sway. 
The upshot of Dodd-Frank is that it continues and even 
formalizes massive subsidies and incentives for risk within the 
financial firm.  Managers continue to have the means and the 
motive to crash the global financial system.  Our debt laden 
economy will certainly provide the opportunity for financial 
manipulation of risk.  The global economy and the U.S. economy 
remain mired in debt.  With continuing financial losses for the 
banking sector, the credit mechanism seems broken and bankers 
continue to hoard massive cash.  The basic structure of the global 
economy will continue to generate more debt in the developed 
world even as growth is impaired.  Dodd-Frank seems oblivious 
to all of this. 
Capitalism in America appears destined to continue to 
degenerate into a rigged game in favor of those controlling the 
most amounts of wealth.  Dodd-Frank may well entrench this 
pernicious economic reality by allowing it to fester.  By any 
measure, it preserves the power and economic prospects of the 
very financial elites whose misconduct caused the crisis in the 
first instance.  In my view, the estimated $591 million invested 
in lobbying (since January of 2009)171 and the $112 million 
invested in campaign contributions to the members of the 
conference committee (since 1989)172 yielded precisely the returns 
expected and demanded by our financial elite: the ability to play 
in the high-risk securities and derivatives markets with 
continued government backing without any prospect of being 
broken up. 
Dodd-Frank will prevent a crisis in subprime lending from 
recurring.  But, a future credit crisis, one that may well be 
brewing presently, could deliver a shock to the financial system 
similar to, if not worse than, that which triggered the crisis of 
late 2008.  Dodd-Frank will be useless against that crisis because 
it essentially preserves the power of the financial elite that 
caused the last crisis and preserves the incentives that gave rise 
to that crisis.  Dodd-Frank stands as a monument to a deeply 
misguided, if not actually corrupt, political and economic elite. 
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